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1. Croatia after Tudjman: the ICTY and issues of transitional justice 
 
Dejan Jović 
 
Introduction 
 
Croatia became a member of the NATO in April 2009 and is well on the wayto 
becoming a full member of the European Union in the near future. The prospect of 
membership in these two international organisations has shaped both Croatian 
domestic and foreign policy over the past decade. The main obstacle to Croatia’s 
earlier membership of the European Union was its incomplete and insufficiently 
impressive record on the issues of transitional justice in general, and of its (long-
delayed) co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).  
 
As Victor Peskin and Miecysław Boduszyński argue in their pioneering attempt to 
explain the Croatian policy of transitional justice,
1
 ‘no issue has polarised the post-
authoritarian Croatian political scene as much as the issue of cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)’. It was only 
following the radical change of its policy towards the ICTY after the 2003 period that 
Croatia became a candidate for EU membership. In this chapter, the author will 
explain the reasons for this radical change, and indicate what problems remain still 
unresolved in Croatia’s current approach to transitional justice.. It is argued here  that 
while Croatia has indeed significantly improved its cooperation with the ICTY, its 
achievements on the issue of addressing war crimes domestically (in the legal, 
political and social spheres) have been less impressive. The chapter concludes on a 
semi-pessimistic note, by questioning the prospects of further improvement in the area 
of transitional justice once the external pressure is removed following Croatia’s 
accession to the EU.  
 
The pre-2003 situation 
 
Only a month after the passing away of its founder and first leader, Franjo Tudjman 
(in December 1999), his party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), lost power in 
parliamentary elections to an anti-Tudjmanist coalition of six parties, led by the 
Social-Democrat Ivica Račan. Soon after this, the HDZ presidential candidate, Mate 
Granić, came only third in presidential elections, which were won by another 
outspoken critic of Tudjman’s policy since 1993, Stjepan Mesić. Soon afterwards, the 
ICTY indicted three Croatian generals (Rahim Ademi, Janko Bobetko and Ante 
Gotovina) for crimes committed during the 1990s. As Peskin and Boduszyński argue, 
once in opposition the HDZ developed a rhetorical strategy of equating ‘the tribunal’s 
                                                 
1
 Victor Peskin and Miecysław P. Boduszyński, ‘International Justice and Domestic Politics: Post-
Tudjman Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 55 (2003), no. 7, pp. 1117-1142. 
 2 
indictment against Croatia’s war heroes with attacks on the dignity and legitimacy of 
the so-called Homeland War.’2 The ‘Homeland War’ – as Tudjmanist narrative 
insisted on referring to the conflict of the 1990s in Croatia – was the main element of 
the official narrative about the political identity of the new (post-1990) Croatian state. 
Built up into a new myth, the official interpretation of the ‘Homeland War’ contained 
all important aspects of historical Croatian myths, which were re-interpreted in the 
contemporary context.
3
 Criticism of the ‘Homeland War’, and especially court 
indictments of its main ‘heroes’, were presented as an attack on the very essence of 
Croatian independence.  
 
This strategy worked. Not only did the ultra-cautious and internally heterogeneous 
Račan government already in mid-2001 cease to fully cooperate with the ICTY, but it 
also adopted nationalist rhetoric and – to the surprise of many in international politics 
– it even began to openly criticise the tribunal's indictments of leading Croatian army 
and civilian participants in the conflict. The second-strongest party in government, the 
Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) soon left the government, arguing that Račan 
should have been more explicit in defending the ‘dignity of the Homeland War’, 
which the ICTY had apparently disregarded by indicting some of its main leaders.  
 
The HDZ in opposition organised massive public protests against the ICTY, against 
domestic courts (which in 2001 finally began to raise first charges for crimes 
committed by Croats), and against the Croatian government. The largest rally for the 
'defence of the dignity of the Homeland War', held in Split on 11 February 2001, was 
attended by 150,000 supporters. The main speaker, Tudjman's successor as leader of 
the HDZ, Ivo Sanader, revived the ultranationalist rhetoric of the late Franjo Tudjman, 
when opposing the indictment of General Mirko Norac by Croatian courts on charges 
of crimes against humanity and the killing of approximately 40 Serb civilians near 
Gospić in October 1991.4 In his speech the then leader of the opposition said: 
 
The [election of] 3 January 2000
5
 was one big misunderstanding. I am joining here all 
these who will never give up in their pride and persistence. No nation would abandon 
its heroes. Nor will the Croatian nation abandon the best of all Croatian sons – and 
these are General Bobetko, and all the other generals, including one who is not with 
us physically but who is with us in spirit – General Mirko Norac… The shameful 
politics of this government forces our generals, our Croatian officers, into hiding; 
they are forcing them to be ashamed of themselves and of what they did for Croatia… 
Here is our message to that government: we are proud of our Croatian generals, we 
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are proud of our Croatian officers, we are proud of all those who defended the 
homeland, and we are proud of our noble Mirko Norac.
6
 
 
This tough line against the first attempts to address war crimes both in domestic 
courts and by full cooperation with the ICTY helped HDZ to quickly recover from 
what seemed to be a disastrous loss of support in 2000-2001. In the January 2000 
election the HDZ won 30.5 % of the vote, which translated into 46 of 151 seats in 
Croatian parliament. On 25 January its presidential candidate, the former foreign 
minister Mate Granić, came only third with 22.5% of the vote. By the end of 2000, 
opinion polls showed that only 5% of the electorate approved the policies of the 
previous HDZ government. This was largely due to media reporting on various cases 
of corruption, abuse of office and financial malversations by the leading members of 
the party. The HDZ was facing a serious danger of being marginalised or even 
disappearing from Croatian politics altogether.  
 
It was by its sharp criticism of the ICTY that the HDZ re-invented itself and staged a 
quick comeback. In May 2001, the party was supported by 16 % of the electorate, in 
June 2002 by 23% and in February 2003 by 30%. According to public opinion 
surveys, in September 2002, 84 % of Croats opposed sending General Bobetko to the 
Hague, whereas 71 % were against even if this meant that economic and political 
sanctions were to be introduced.
7
  
 
Presenting itself as the main opponent of the ‘devaluation of the Homeland War’ was 
not the only reason for HDZ’s success at the 2003 elections, but it was certainly one 
of the most significant. At these elections, HDZ won 66 seats (or 43.4% of the vote) – 
enough to form a government, although not without a coalition with a number of 
smaller parties and representatives of national minorities. On the basis of the HDZ's 
strong protests against the ICTY, political analysts expected that once in power the 
party would continue to pursue a sovereignist policy, and de facto halt any further 
cooperation with the ICTY.  
 
This, however, did not happen. On the contrary, since 2003 the HDZ has completely 
abolished its anti-ICTY rhetoric and reformed its foreign policy. It also changed 
important aspects of its domestic policies, although reforms in this area were less 
radical. In 2003-2007, the HDZ government removed those obstacles to cooperation 
with the ICTY that it had inherited from the previous government. Thus by the time of 
the latest parliamentary elections in 2007, the state television (under strong influence 
of the HDZ-led government) refused to broadcast a paid political advertisment by the 
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), which consisted only of short extracts from Ivo 
Sanader’s radically anti-ICTY speech in Split six years before.8 Sanader in opposition 
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was so much different from Sanader in power that he did not want the general public 
to be reminded of this change. 
 
This radical U-turn was of the utmost importance. The ICTY does not have its own 
mechanisms to implement policies, but largely depends on the will of nation-states to 
cooperate. Without domestic political changes in Croatia itself, it is hard to see how 
the ICTY could successfully pursue charges against Croat participants in the conflicts 
of the 1990s. The U-turn had enormous consequences for the domestic political scene 
in Croatia too. While in the whole period since its formation in 1989 the HDZ had 
been the key organiser and political instrument of nationalist extremism, the political 
change after 2003 deprived the extremists of representation in the main political 
institutions in Croatia. By its re-positioning itself from extreme right to moderate 
conservative pro-EU centre-right party, the HDZ contributed to the marginalisation of 
extremist political options in Croatian politics.
9
 This internal reform of the HDZ 
enabled the second (post-nationalist) transition to take place in Croatia. So, how can 
this change be explained?  
 
Explaining the radical change in 2003 
 
In explaining the reasons for Sanader’s U-turn in 2003, one should pay attention to 
changes in the Croatian political context after the death of Tudjman, leading to 
changes in Croatia’s foreign policy, and creating a more receptive environment for 
EU conditionality to work. In this context, the coordinated and consistent efforts of 
the ICTY and the EU to secure Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY bore fruit. 
 
The changing political context 
 
When Franjo Tudjman died, the HDZ was looking for a new leader. Two candidates 
emerged as the strongest pretenders: the former chief domestic policy advisor to 
Tudjman, Ivić Pašalić, and Tudjman’s former Chef de Cabinet, Ivo Sanader. Pašalić 
represented hardliners, extreme nationalists, and various interest groups suspected of 
being linked with organised crime. Born in Herzegovina, Pašalić was also associated 
with some of those Herzegovinan Croats who in the late 1990s had already been 
indicted by the ICTY for crimes committed during the Bosniak-Croat atrocities in 
1993-1994.
10
 By 2000, the majority of the Croatian electorate opposed the significant 
influences that Herzegovinan Croats had over policy-making in Croatia during the 
time of Franjo Tudjman. Following the death of Tudjman’s right-hand man, the 
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Minister of Defence Gojko Šušak11 (another influential Herzegovinan), Ivić Pašalić 
became the main protector and representative of Herzegovinan interests in Croatian 
politics.  
 
On the other hand, Ivo Sanader was representative of a more moderate wing of the 
party. Born in Split, Sanader has a Ph.D in literature from an Austrian university, and 
was a theatre artistic director and a publisher before entering politics. During the first 
year and a half after Tudjman’s death the two factions (Sanader’s and Pašalić’s) 
fought an internal battle for control over the HDZ. In the final episode of his battle, in 
April 2002, Sanader managed to win the intra-party elections, although rather 
narrowly: with 1,005 delegates at the party congress voting for him, and 912 for 
Pašalić.12 In the whole period between 2000 and 2003, however, Sanader’s leadership 
was under threat. If he wanted to secure it, Sanader simply could not afford losing 
votes even from more radical quarters of the party. At the same time, however, he had 
to modernise the party and move it towards the centre-ground. His Split speech was 
styled to satisfy the radical oponents within the party, and to revive its chances of 
becoming once again the dominant force in Croatian politics. It was only with the 
success at 2003 parliamentary elections that Sanader definitely managed to 
consolidate his leadership within the HDZ. He was now free to make a radical break 
with extremism – and this is what he subsequently did.  
 
Meanwhile, in March 2003, Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjić was assassinated 
in a joint action of various groups belonging to the underworld network of organised 
crime and parts of the Serbian police Units for Special Operations (JSO). The case 
demonstrated that the link between state structures that were loyal to the former 
President, Slobodan Milošević, and the criminal underworld are still strong in Serbia. 
But, for the main part of the 1990s, Croatia and Serbia were ‘Siamese Twins’ of the 
conflict – the political and security situation in one of them inevitably influenced the 
other. As it would turn out, some of the main organisers of this assassination (for 
example, Milorad Luković/Ulemek Legija) had links with the Croatian underworld. 
Cooperation between organised crime groups in the Western Balkans flourished 
during the 1990s. While in public various warlords presented themselves as 
uncompromising nationalists, beneath the surface they developed networks of support 
with each other (regardless of ethnic, ideological and political backgrounds) and 
worked together when this benefited their interests.
13
  
 
The assassination of Zoran Djindjić sent a clear message to all politicians in the 
region – and especially in Croatia – that the forces that dominated in the 1990s had 
not yet been fully defeated. The assassination of Djindjić – which happened only days 
after his appointment of a special state prosecutor for war crimes -– was an additional 
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motive for Croatian politicians to act against the extremists who belonged (or claimed 
to belong) to ‘their own’ side – especially those still in official positions in the army 
and police, who were suspected of developing links with the criminal underworld. 
Once he became Prime Minister, Sanader in fact welcomed some of the ICTY 
indictments as they enabled him to eliminate such a threat in the most elegant way – 
by extradition to The Hague.  
 
Political changes in the Western Balkans following the end of Tudjman’s and 
Milošević’s reign in Croatia and Serbia respectively, opened a realistic perspective for 
all countries of the region to move closer to membership of the European Union – but 
not without serious domestic reforms and enhanced mutual cooperation within the 
region. In addition, with the defeat of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, and subsequent 
confederalisation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro (SCG) in 2002, Croatia no longer had any reason to fear that 
Belgrade would favour the re-creation of a 'new Yugoslavia.'  
 
Thus, in the first months after becoming the Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader indicated the 
change of policy towards Belgrade. He proposed close cooperation, and found it easy 
to work with new Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica. In this he was 
supported and encouraged by the Croatian business elite, which saw its chance in 
opening of Serbian market to foreign investors. This has had profound effects on 
domestic politics in Croatia, and it opened the space for further (joint or at least co-
ordinated) action on war crimes. However, as will be explained further in this chapter, 
the results were rather limited.  
 
The next significant factor in Sanader’s change of course was coalition politics. Out 
of political necessity, in 2003 the HDZ entered into a coalition agreement with the 
main party of Croatian Serbs, the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS). This 
coalition survived elections in 2007, when its position was further consolidated by a 
representative of the SDSS, Slobodan Uzelac, being appointed the Deputy Prime 
Minister in charge of regional development. The HDZ-SDSS coalition eased tensions 
between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats throughout the country. It also introduced a 
model of bi-national cooperation rather than conflict at the highest and middle levels 
of politics. Less has been done on lower levels, in municipalities and villages. This 
has been a slow and painful process. Nevertheless, with the main Serb party now in 
government, it became more difficult to avoid and/or undermine ICTY cooperation 
from within the official institutions. Although the SDSS has been cautious on the 
issue of the ‘Homeland War’, it nevertheless used its new position to de facto 
challenge some of its main aspects, as well as to actively raise issues of crimes 
committed against ethnic Serbs in 1995. This has been done with mixed success.  
 
 
Meanwhile, some of the leading participants in the ‘Homeland War’ started to tarnish 
its mythical image. The official discourse developed by Croatian elites in the 
aftermath of the conflict presented Croatia as both victim and victor in the war. On 13 
December 2000 a special declaration was enacted by the Croatian parliament, which 
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defined the character of Croatian participation in the war in the 1990s as ‘just and 
legitimate, defensive and liberating.’14 Peskin and Boduszyński identify the adherence 
to such a one-sided definition of the war as being one of the main impediments to 
Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. Although the text of the Declaration also invites 
Croatian courts to process all ‘possible instances of individual crimes’ committed 
during the war, actual indictments of Croatian participants were seen as contravening 
Article 5 of the Declaration by which the state was invited to ‘provide full protection, 
respect and welfare’ of all the ‘defenders’.  
 
However, in recent years there have been several cases in which some of the main 
participants in the Homeland War, including some its 'heroes', were exposed in illegal 
or unethical situations. The most extreme example is that of General Ivan Korade, the 
former commander of 7th Army Brigade, the first to enter Knin upon its re-taking by 
Croatian forces in August 1995. In March 2008, Korade murdered four civilians and a 
policeman before committing suicide in what was the worst case of uncontrolled use 
of weapons in the post-war Croatia.
15
 Then stories of other crimes committed by this 
‘hero' (who was never indicted by the ICTY) became public. Among them was the 
case of five Serb prisoners of war whose murder he allegedly ordered in 1995.
16
 
Public prosecutors – as it turned out – knew about the case, but had decided to not 
pursue it further, apparently because no witnesses were willing to testify. It was only 
when Korade committed crimes against (Croat) civilians that these previous crimes 
came to public attention.  
 
Another General, Vladimir Zagorac, was indicted by Croatian courts on charges of 
embezzlement of about 5 million euro of the funds collected by the Croatian diaspora 
for defence purposes during the 1992-1995 period.
17
 In 2007 Zagorac fled to Austria 
and – unsuccessfully, as it would turn out – launched legal action in order to avoid 
extradition to Croatia. It was only then then it was 'discovered' that he also had strong 
links with networks of organised crime – both within Croatia and elsewhere in the 
Western Balkans. On 2 March 2009 he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment 
and a confiscation of property amounting to 39.4 million Kuna (about 5.25 million 
euro).  
 
Cases such as these – to mention but a few – undermined to a degree the myth of the 
Homeland War, enabling a more critical reflection on the recent past. This was also 
the case because they openly posed a question of justice and equality between those 
ordinary soldiers who were drafted (often under threat) to the 'Homeland War' in 
which they risked their lives, and those in high positions of authority during that war 
who did not really see much of the frontline, yet had done extremely well for 
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themselves. All this only further facilitated the government's cooperation with the 
ICTY. 
  
 
Changing foreign policy priorities 
 
During the 1990s, Croatia’s official attitude towards the project of European 
integration was mixed. On the one hand, HDZ under Tudjman argued that Croatia had 
‘always’ belonged to Europe for historical, geographical, cultural and political 
reasons, and should thus, naturally, ‘return to Europe’ by ‘leaving the Balkans 
behind’. However, Tudjman was also critical of the European Union, for both 
ideological and pragmatic reasons. In his books, he argued that multi-cultural entities 
are not viable in the long-term.
18
 The lesson from the collapse of Yugoslavia – a 
multicultural and largely confederal political structure – should have been learnt, he 
said, by Brussels too. Thus the very project of the European Union – especially in its 
post-Maastricht phase – was viewed with scepticism and suspicion. For Croatian 
nationalists, it was difficult to accept that one day, in an enlarged European Union, 
there would be no heavily guarded border with Serbia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina (and in 
particular with its Republic of Srpska), and that the level of integration with these 
neighbours would become higher than it had been in the last years of Yugoslavia.  
 
Tudjman’s criticism of the EU was also based on its alleged failure to support Croatia 
during the most difficult times of the conflict – in particular prior to the destruction of 
Vukovar, in November 1991. Had it not been for the decisive support by the US in 
1995, Tudjman argued, Croatia would have waited much longer for the reintegration 
of its territory. When the EU criticised him for not punishing crimes committed by 
Croatian troops in former Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for his authoritarian 
style of governance, he responded with anger: 
 
Some European states dare to teach us lessons on how to treat minorities. They have 
forgotten that a democratic France, for example, does not even recognise the 
existence of minorities on its soil. Or, they urge us that we must return all Serbs who 
fled Croatia during the war back to Croatia, but they forget that they could not solve 
problems like that between the Czech Republic and Germany, etc.
19
  
 
Following such rhetoric, Croatia’s relationship with the EU entered a most difficult 
phase, and was de facto frozen in 1995-2000. This changed only in January 2000, 
when HDZ lost parliamentary elections. The EU reacted quickly and enthusiastically. 
Already in November 2000, the heads of states and governments of the EU held the 
summit in Zagreb the launched the Stabilisation and Association Process, and in 2001 
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the SAA was signed with Croatia. However, the lack of cooperation with the ICTY 
halted the process of EU accession once again. Thus, Croatia missed not only the 
chance to join the EU in the ‘big bang’ of 2004, but also in 2007 – with Bulgaria and 
Romania.
20
  
 
With marginalisation of the Tudjmanists in Croatian politics as of 2003, the most 
significant obstacles to EU accession disappeared. The two largest parties – the HDZ 
in government and SDP in opposition – agreed to form an informal ‘Pact for Europe’ 
and to support each other in jointly leading the country towards the EU. But the lack 
of full cooperation with the ICTY remained an obstacle which led to a new delay in 
the ratification of the SAA. This obstacle was fully removed only after the arrest of 
General Gotovina, in December 2005.  
 
At the same time, Croatia changed its policy towards the countries of the Western 
Balkans. During the Tudjman era, regional cooperation was ruled out by the 
president’s fears that it might lead to a ‘reconstruction’ of some ‘new Yugoslavia’ 
(despite the fact that actually there was no desire for its reconstruction in any other 
parts of former Yugoslavia, including in Serbia). However, by 2003 Croatia realised 
that one possible road to Brussels leads via the capitals of the neighbouring countries: 
primarily Belgrade and Sarajevo. Stability and reconciliation in the Western Balkans 
became a precondition for accession to the European Union. For this reason too, 
Croatia improved bilateral relations with both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, and in 
2005 (nine years after it was created) joined the Southeast European Cooperation 
Process.
21
  
 
This new policy improved regional cooperation in all areas, including in security and 
defence. This in turn enhanced co-ordination of actions against organised crime, as 
well as addressing the remaining issues of war crimes and crimes committed during 
the conflict of the 1990s.  
 
 
ICTY and EU policy towards Croatia 
 
As already explained, the ICTY and EU coordinated to a reasonable degree their 
policies of ‘sticks and carrots’ towards Croatia. The EU accession talks were in 
principle conditioned upon full cooperation with the ICTY, and the reports on this 
cooperation were a substantive part of the decision-making process – although there 
was a degree of flexibility in the interpretation of their importance for this process. It 
was only when the ICTY confirmed that Croatia had really improved cooperation and 
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was assisting the efforts to identify, arrest and extradite the war crime suspects, that 
the EU approved further steps in talks between EU and Croatia. This policy was 
successful. Not only did co-ordinated pressure from Brussels and The Hague secure 
Croatia’s full commitment to working with the ICTY, but it also strengthened 
moderate and pro-European forces domestically. The ICTY indictments removed 
some of the main protagonists of extreme nationalism from the Croatian public scene. 
Marginalisation of the extremists domestically would have been a much more difficult 
task had it been left entirely to forces within Croatia itself. Once the HDZ moved 
away from extremism in 2003, the pressure from the ICTY assisted the process of 
further consolidation of moderate and pro-European policies. This was in sharp 
contrast to the situation in 2000-2003, when the ICTY indictments in fact became an 
obstacle to consolidation of the Račan government, and when they – unintentionally - 
helped the consolidation of the HDZ-led opposition that rallied against the 
‘discrediting of the Homeland War’. 
 
One can only conclude that domestic forces played a very important role in the 
success of the ICTY in achieving its objectives. On this particular issue (co-operation 
with the ICTY) the external factors played an important and largely constructive role 
in supporting the anti-extremist forces in Croatian politics, but it was primarily the 
transformation of the domestic political scene that secured a break with the 
Tudjmanist policy of isolationism and nationalist extremism. This change was due to 
both a significant shift in Croatian public opinion in the post-conflict period, and to 
changed circumstances in the region. It was possible only once Franjo Tudjman died – 
not before.
22
 Above and beyond all these contributing elements, change after 2003 
was caused by enhanced understanding among Croatian nationalists that the 
membership of the European Union can only secure and enlarge – not endanger or 
diminish – the level of de facto sovereignty of the new Croatian state.  
 
Although internationally recognised back in January 1992, Croatian internal and 
external sovereignty remained rather unfulfilled and largely symbolic throughout the 
1990s. Even when Croatia re-integrated the breakaway regions of Krajina, Western 
and Eastern Slavonia under its legal sovereignty, it still remained the subject of 
various international inspections and observations. Throughout the 1990s there were 
UN and OSCE missions on Croatian territory, and the ICTY commanded authority 
that superseded that of the domestic legal system. This – from the nationalists’ point 
of view entirely undesirable - supervision hurt their pride, and prompted them to do 
what was necessary in order to transform Croatia from an ‘internationally supervised 
state’ into a ‘fully sovereign state’. Croatian moderate nationalists – including those in 
the HDZ – concluded that it was only via membership of the EU that these forms of 
external supervision would cease. Thus, they decided to cooperate.  
 
The remaining problems 
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 It is very difficult to imagine anything similar to the 5
th
 October (2000) protests against Milošević (in 
Serbia) happening in Croatia. It also very unlikely that Tudjman would have been removed from 
power, arrested and extradited to The Hague had he been indicted – as Milošević was in June 2001.  
 11 
Croatia’s improved record of cooperation with the ICTY since 2003 has not been 
matched with similar improvement in all areas of transitional justice, which was 
largely due to the lack of external pressure on the government in Zagreb. The results 
are particularly weak when it comes to raising public awareness of the war crimes 
committed by Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the breakaway region of Krajina. In 
fact, for a long time there was no serious will to openly discuss war crimes committed 
by Croats. Content analysis of the news programmes of the state-owned Croatian 
Television and of the largest-circulation daily Večernji List, concludes that these 
topics were ‘covered very little and very superficially’. 23  There are some honourable 
exceptions to this trend though: the Split-based weekly Feral Tribune has since its 
first issue (in 1993) been an outspoken reporter on crimes committed by all sides, and 
so were two marginal publications: the anti-war magazine Arkzin, and the left-wing 
monthly Hrvatska Ljevica. But all three have sinceclosed down, due to financial and 
political pressure against them. These pressures were – at least in part – a 
consequence of its writing about the war crimes. The state-television is still rather 
closed when it comes to the topic of the war crimes, with the possible exception of the 
popular political talk-show Latinica.  
 
In line with other former Yugoslav states (with the partial exception of Bosnia-
Herzegovina), Croatia decided not to implement lustration of those who held public 
office in the 1990s. Even those who were currently facing trials for war crimes or 
indeed those who (like General Mirko Norac) have been sentenced for them are still 
treated primarily as the ‘defenders in the Homeland War’, not as accused and 
convicted of committing serious crimes. Croatian law does not allow for a military 
rank to be taken away from retired military personnel, thus the generals sentenced for 
crimes (such as Norac) can still count on a high state pension and privileges based on 
their military rank.  
 
The state contributes to funding the legal defence of those on trial at the ICTY, and 
assists their defence teams in building the case. Public opinion polls conducted in 
Croatia reveal a high degree of animosity towards the ICTY, which is still often 
portrayed as being ‘anti-Croatian’. The main complaint about its activities is on 
account of the ICTY’s alleged attempt to promote an ‘artificial balance’ between Serb 
and Croat war crimes. The overwhelming majority of Croats see Croatia as being the 
victor of the legitimate, defensive and just war, and the victim of (Serbian) 
aggression. They ask themselves: can the side that is acting in self-defence be said to 
have committed war crimes?  The idea that some Croats too committed crimes against 
others is difficult to accept.  
 
There are few NGOs in Croatia focused on issues of war crimes, and transitional 
justice in general. In addition to the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Protection of 
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Human Rights (HHO), the most active is Zagreb-based Documenta. Its recent report 
identifies four major problems with regard to issues of transitional justice in Croatia.
24
  
Firstly, trials for war crimes in domestic courts are still often biased against ethnic 
Serbs, and/or in favour of ethnic Croats. Members of the Serb minority are much 
more likely to be indicted and sentenced for such crimes than members of the Croat 
majority (on this, see also chapter 3). Secondly, many of these trials were conducted 
in absentia, without the accused being present.
25
 Thirdly, there is a complete lack of 
adequate witness protection, and some witnesses (or potential witnesses) for the ICTY 
have been murdered in circumstances that have not been clarified.
26
 During the trial of 
the wartime commander of defence of Osijek, Branimir Glavaš, the media openly 
revealed the identity of key witnesses, who were subsequently harrassed and 
subjected to threats. The same was the case in the trial against members of the 
military police suspected of the torture and killing of a number of Montenegrin and 
Serb prisoners in an ad hoc prisoners camp, Lora, in Split.  
 
Fourthly, there is still insufficient legal representation of the victims. In addition, there 
is not much political or media pressure to address the crimes committed against 
Croatian Serbs. This is largely due to the fact that many of them – about 300,000 
according to some official estimates
27
 – left Croatia following the military and police 
actions of Croatian forces against the self-declared Krajina in 1995. Only about 
120,000 have returned since, but a very large number of them only formally, to 
regulate citizenship and property rights – rather than to physically move back 
permanently.
28
 Subsequently, they have not participated in discussions in the Croatian 
media. Despite its position in government, the main Serb party (SDSS) is in no 
position to insist on the issue of crimes committed by Croatian forces being raised 
publicly. Serb politicians expect their Croat partners in government to take a lead on 
this sensitive issue. They did, however, put on the agenda the issue of  property return 
– both in the physical sense and in terms of property rights. Whereas the Croatian 
state has funded restitution of the property destroyed during the war (regardless of to 
whom it belonged), it is still the case that tenancy rights that were cancelled in court 
proceedings during and after the war have not been restored to ethnic Serbs. 
According to estimates by Serb political parties, in Croat-controlled areas, there were 
about 23,700 cases in which ethnic Serbs lost tenancy rights following extended 
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absence from their socially-owned flats.
29
 In addition, there were thousands of similar 
cases on the terrritory once controlled by the ethnic Serb entity in Krajina.  
 
All these aspects indicate that since 2003 the Croatian government has indeed been 
much more successful in improving its cooperation with the ICTY than in addressing 
the problems of transitional justice domestically. Although the reasons for the new 
policy towards the ICTY were primarily to do with domestic issues (competition 
within the HDZ, consolidation of sovereignty, preservation of the governing coalition 
etc.), without the pressure from outside (from both the EU and ICTY) the change 
would have been much slower and limited in scope. The internal impetus for change 
might not have been sufficient had it not been also for external pressure. Where these 
external influences were weaker the change of policy was less successful.  
 
For this reason, it seems legitimate to wonder about the prospects of transitional 
justice in Croatia in the aftermath of the announced closure of the ICTY in the 
foreseeable future. In addition, the question must be asked: what is the future of 
transitional justice once Croatia becomes a member of the European Union? The new 
policy of  cooperation with the ICTY was – among other things – a condition sine qua 
non of any further accession moves. Once its main foreign policy objective is 
achieved, Croatia is more likely to slow down all further reforms of its various 
domestic policies – including in the sensitive, controversial and unpopular area of 
transitional justice, which is so directly linked with both the official interpretation of 
national identity and with still raw personal and collective memories of the turbulent 
recent past.  
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